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Abstract
This paper studies oligopolistic competition in o¤-patent pharma-
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model can explain the observation that countries with stronger reg-
ulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the
di¤erences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may
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1 Introduction
Few markets exhibit such extensive price regulation as the market for phar-
maceutical products1. There is evidence that price regulation can actually
reduce competition. Market shares of lower-priced (generic) versions of a
product tend to be lower in countries with more severely constrained prices.
In a recent study, Danzon and Chao (2000) show that the countries with
stronger price regulations are usually those where the e¤ect on price of the
number of generic producers is smaller.
The purpose of this paper is to explain, …rst, this tendency of regulation to
generate higher market shares for the higher-priced versions of the product,
and also to endogeneize the choice of policies by the countries. This, in
turn, has some policy implications for supra-national organizations, like the
European Union.
We do this by proposing a duopoly model of vertical product di¤erenti-
ation in which, …rst, the government announces a price ceiling. Then, the
…rms set a “perceived” quality level for the product, and …nally they compete
in prices, taking into account the government-set price ceiling. We …nd that
the lower the price ceiling, the higher the market share of the higher-priced
variety. This is independent of the parameter values of the model: the size
and variety of tastes in the market, and the size and convexity of the costs
of producing perceived quality. The intuition for this result relies on the fact
that market shares depend on the ratio of the price ceiling to the high quality.
But the quality responds to the price ceiling less than proportionally, due to
the convexity of the cost of quality.
The other important result of the paper has to do with public policy. It is
not clear in this context what should be the objective function of the planner.
We have been quite careful so far in talking about a “perceived” quality
level. The de…nition of a generic pharmaceutical product varies somewhat
from country to country, but in general it is required to be therapeutically
equivalent in most key clinical dimensions as the product which it is designed
to replace. For this reason one could consider that “perceived quality” should
be irrelevant to the regulator, whose objective should merely be to maximize
“actual” welfare. We show that under a social welfare function which uses
a measure of “objective” welfare for the consumers, the implied policy is
1“In sum, e¤orts by national authorities to curb pharmaceutical costs and o¤set the
demand-increasing e¤ects of generous health care insurance by imposing drug price controls
are found throughout the industrialized and less-developed world” Scherer (2000).
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to set the lowest ceiling consistent with the participation constraint for the
…rm. This is true even though the …rms pro…ts are incorporated into the
social welfare measure. This is, arguably, not what we observe even in the
most regulated countries. And, in any case, it cannot account for the cross-
sectional variations that we observe between the regulatory environment of
di¤erent countries. So it seems reasonable to explore alternative measures of
welfare.
The alternative we consider is to use the “perceived” utility of the con-
sumers for the consumer surplus. We …nd that the “optimal” price ceiling,
from the point of view of the companies, may be higher than the one that
maximizes total social welfare (consumer surplus plus …rms’ pro…ts). This
is because lower regulated prices imply more competition in quality. When
quality production is expensive, this is bad for the companies. Indeed, high
marginal costs of production of quality is one of the conditions under which
society prefers lower ceilings than the producers.
This result is interesting because countries with stronger regulations (and
similar sizes, and wealth) tend to be the largest net importers of pharmaceuti-
cal products. Which suggests that regulation could be driven by considering
only the welfare of the “local” agents, the consumers. This observation,
in turn, leads to the implication that supranational organizations, like the
European, could undertake a role in harmonizing the price regulations in a
way that internalizes the welfare of all actors involved in this game, thereby
possibly enhancing total social welfare. Naturally, there may be a need for
supranational compensations to achieve agreements.
Earlier literature on generic competition (Frank and Salkever 1992, 1997,
Scherer 1996, pp. 376-378) has emphasized the fact that brand-name drug
prices tend to increase after generic entry. The simpler version of our model
cannot account for this fact. However, a slightly modi…ed version of the
model, presented in appendix A, predicts brand-name price increases after
generic entry. The reason for the di¤erence between the models is a con‡ict
between the market segmentation and market reduction efects of generic
entry.
2 Background and previous work
An introduction and overview to the issue of price controls in the pharma-
ceutical industry can be obtained from Danzon (1997). Scherer (2000) has a
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section on price controls, besides providing an introduction to the pharma-
ceutical industry. Jacobzone (2000) is a descriptive work summarizing public
policies in the pharmaceutical market.
Danzon and Chao (2000) show that price regulation causes a decreased
impact of generic competition in price reductions. Previous empirical work
had shown some evidence of competition after generic entry (Grabowski and
Vernon 1992, Reekie 1996, Ellison 1997), but the results could not compare
such a large array of countries with di¤erent regulatory regimes to make
informed guesses as to the e¤ect of policies. None of these studies investigates
theoretically the causes underlying the di¤erence in regulatory regimes.
One of the more studied regulatory measures is that of reference pricing
(López-Casasnovas and Puig Junoy 2001 survey the literature on reference
pricing). Mestre-Ferrándiz (2001) studies the impact of reference prices in
pharmaceutical markets with generic competition. He studies two di¤erent
versions of the system. In one version consumers are subsidised a ‡at sum
of money for the product, irrespective of which brand they buy. In an-
other version they are paid a proportion of the …nal price of the good. He
…nds that, the …rst version increases costs for the health authority but en-
hances consumers’ welfare. The second system may actually decrease costs
for the health system. This paper is closer to ours than other papers which
also model the e¤ect of reference prices in pharmaceutical markets (Danzon
and Liu 1997, Zweifel and Crivelly 1997). The others tend to focus on the
price impacts, rather than on the welfare and political economy sides of the
question. Mestre-Ferrándiz, however, does not try to understand the cross
country di¤erences that Danzon and Chao (2000) uncover.
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) shows that generic entry was followed by
price increases by the branded producer, a result later con…rmed by Frank
and Salkever (1997). This was called the Generic Competition Paradox by
Scherer (1993). Frank and Salkever (1992) or Mestre-Ferrándiz (1999) pro-
vide theoretical explanations for this phenomenon using brand loyalty in
horizontal product di¤erentiation models. We show, without using brand
loyalty, that vertical product di¤erentiation can also explain this fact, al-
though only for some distributions of tastes. Indeed, Caves, Whinston and
Hurwitz (1992), with a di¤erent sample show modest price decreases by the
branded good producer after generic entry.
Gambardella, Orsenigo and Pammolli (2000) study the issue of innovation
in pharmaceuticals. We have neglected this issue because patent length and
breadth is supposed to be the tool for innovation policy. But their paper
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coincides with ours in emphasizing the need for coordination between policies
in di¤erent countries. Lack of coordination would lead to (potentially welfare-
decreasing) free-riding by the countries which do not house innovating …rms.
3 The model
We use a game of vertical product di¤erentiation 2 to analyze the problem.
Consumers have utility function:
U =
(
µu¡ p; if she buys one unit of the good of quality u at price p
0; otherwise
The symbol µ represents a taste parameter. The distribution of µ is uniform
and µ 2 [0; ¹µ]. The total mass of consumers is given by S.
Firm A is the branded producer and …rm B is the generic producer.
Firms decide on the quality they want to produce. Quality here should
be understood as “perceived” quality, as generic products are legislated to
be therapeutically identical to the branded products. To produce di¤erent
“quality” levels, …rms have to alter consumer’s perceptions, which they can
do by resorting to marketing tools. So they incur a …xed cost Fi = kAu
°
°
; i 2
fA;Bg; which is convex in the level of quality.3 We assume that kA · kB
so that the branded producer can produce quality at a lower cost than the
generic producer. This is reasonable since the branded producer has typically
been the patent holder and has been in the market for a long time, so at a
minimum there is less uncertainty about its product.
The game unfolds as follows. First the government “declares” a maximum
price that the producers can charge for the product. Then, the …rms decide
on the quality level, u, with which they will endow their products. Finally
the …rms compete in prices.
We solve the game backwards.
Denote by p the maximum price set by the government.
We …rst solve for the demand faced by the top and bottom quality …rms.
Denote by µhl the buyer indi¤erent between the high quality and the low
quality goods. Then, given the utility function, µhl = (ph ¡ pl)=(qh ¡ ql).
2See e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), and Motta (1993).
3This particular functional form is widely used in this type of models. See, e.g., Motta
(1993).
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Denote by µl0 the buyer indi¤erent between the low quality good and not
consuming. Then, µl0 = pl=ql. Since µ is uniformly distributed, and the mass
of consumers is S; we have that the demands are:
Dh =
S
¹µ
µ
¹µ ¡ ph ¡ pl
uh ¡ ul
¶
; Dl =
S
¹µ
µ
ph ¡ pl
uh ¡ ul ¡
pl
ul
¶
:
Assuming that the constraint ph · p is not binding, the reaction function
for the high quality …rm is given by:
S
¹µ
µ
¹µ ¡ 2ph ¡ pl
uh ¡ ul
¶
= 0;
So that the best response to pl by the h …rm is:
ph =
( ¹µ(uh¡ul)+pl
2
; if
¹µ(uh¡ul)¡pl;
2
· p
p; otherwise
The reaction function for the low quality …rm, taking as given the high
quality price, is:
S
¹µ
µ
ph ¡ 2pl
uh ¡ ul ¡
2pl
ul
¶
= 0;
from where we obtain:
pl =
phul
2uh
:
So that the equilibrium of this subgame is:
(ph; pl) =
8<:
³
2¹µ(uh¡ul)uh
4uh¡ul ;
¹µ(uh¡ul)ul
4uh¡ul
´
if 2
¹µ(uh¡ul)uh
4uh¡ul · p³
p; pul
2uh
´
otherwise
We …rst calculate the equilibrium in the quality subgame assuming that
the price constraint is not binding, and then turn to the situation with the
binding price constraint. We assume that the high quality will be produced
by the branded producer and the low quality by the generic producer, and
check whether this is an equilibrium. At least for some parameter values the
opposite situation (generic producers delivering the perceived higher quality)
would also be an equilibrium. Since this is not the empirically relevant case,
we will focus on the equilibrium where the perceived high quality is produced
by the branded producer4.
4For additional theoretical and experimental reasons why this is the relevant equi-
librium (in a closely related model) see Cabrales, García-Fontes and Motta (2000) and
Cabrales and Motta (2001).
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3.1 Non-binding price ceilings
We now substitute the expression for the equilibrium prices into the pro…t
functions of the …rms:
¦h =
4S¹µ(uh ¡ ul)u2h
(4uh ¡ ul)2 ¡ kA
u°h
°
;
¦l =
S¹µ(uh ¡ ul)uhul
(4uh ¡ ul)2 ¡ kB
u°l
°
The …rst order conditions for the …rms in the quality subgame are:
@¦h
@uh
=
4¹µS [4u3h ¡ 3u2hul + 2uhu2l )]
(4uh ¡ ul)3 ¡ kAu
°¡1
h = 0;
@¦l
@ul
=
¹µS [4u2h ¡ 7u2hul]
(4uh ¡ ul)3 ¡ kAu
°¡1
h = 0:
Let ¹ = uh=ul. Then, if we divide marginal revenues by marginal costs we
obtain:
4(4¹2 ¡ 3¹+ 2)
4¹2 ¡ 7¹ =
kA
kB
¹°¡1
which leads to the following implicit expression for ¹:
kA
kB
¹°¡1(4¹2 ¡ 7¹)¡ 16¹2 + 12¹¡ 8 = 0
Let f(¹) = kA
kB
¹°¡1(4¹2 ¡ 7¹)¡ 16¹2 + 12¹¡ 8
Lemma 1 The equation f(¹) = 0 can have only one solution for ¹ ¸ 1.
Proof. See appendix B.
The lemma shows that there can only be one possible equilibrium with the
brand-name producer as the higher-priced variety. To obtain the candidate
equilibrium qualities we go back to the …rst order conditions and we obtain:
u¤h =
Ã
4¹µS [4¹3 ¡ 3¹2 + 2)]
kA(4¹¡ 1)3
! 1
°¡1
; u¤l =
Ã
¹µS [4¹3 ¡ 7¹2]
kB(4¹¡ 1)3
! 1
°¡1
We have said that this is a “candidate” equilibrium. This is so because the
pro…t functions from where the …rst-order conditions are obtained assume
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that …rm A produces the higher quality and …rm B the lower one. So there
could be, in principle, values for the quality for …rm A (respectively B) such
that the pro…ts were higher if …rm A chose a value of quality lower than u¤l (or
a value higher than u¤h for …rm B) holding u
¤
l (respectively u
¤
h) constant. We
have not been able to show that this is not the case analytically. However,
extensive numerical simulations seem to rule it out. As an example, Figure
1 shows the candidate equilibrium pro…ts (calculated numerically with Mat-
lab) for both …rms, for a range of values of kA=kB and …xed values for the
remaining parameters. It also shows the highest possible pro…ts for …rm A
(respectively B) when choosing a value of quality lower than u¤l (or a value
higher than u¤h for …rm B) holding u
¤
l (respectively u
¤
h) constant. All our
numerical simulations are qualitatively identical. So, at least for all those
parameters for which we have checked, the candidate equilibrium is indeed
an equilibrium. Notice, too, that it is the only candidate for an equilibrium.
From our characterization of an equilibrium, we can get one result of
interest.
Proposition 2 If ° ¸ 2, the equilibrium price of the high quality good is
higher under monopoly than under duopoly.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Earlier literature on generic competition (Frank and Salkever 1992, 1997)
has emphasized the fact that brand-name drug prices tend to increase after
generic entry. As we just saw, the simpler version of our model cannot
account for this fact. Generic entry has two di¤erent e¤ects on prices. On
the one hand it induces market segmentation. The brand-name producer
specializes in selling to consumers with stronger tastes for quality, who are
prepared to pay a higher price for the product. This …rst e¤ect tends to
make brand-name prices higher. On the other hand, it reduces the size of
the market over which quality expenses have to be recouped. Thus, it reduces
the incentives to spend in quality, and so the prices that can be charged. In
the simple version of the model we just presented the size e¤ect dominates,
so the prices are lower. In an appendix we study a related model in which the
segmentation e¤ect dominates. The only change is that the distribution of
consumers is more polarized in the modi…ed version. We could pursue the rest
of the study with a model in which the segmentation e¤ect could be stronger
than in this version, at the expense of computational complexity. Although
this would perhaps enhance the realism of the model (and it would certainly
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be necessary for precise policy work), we feel that if would unnecessarily
obscure the remaining presentation.
3.2 Binding price ceiling
We now turn our attention to the case where the price constraint is binding.
We substitute the expression for the price into the pro…t functions of the
…rms:
¦h =
S¹p
¹µ
"
¹µ ¡ 2puh ¡ pul
2uh(uh ¡ ul)
#
¡ kAu
°
h
°
;
¦l =
Sp2ul
¹µ4uh(uh ¡ ul) ¡ kB
u°l
°
The …rst order conditions for the …rms in the quality subgame are:
@¦h
@uh
=
Sp2
¹µ
"
2u2h ¡ 2uhul + u2l
2u2h(uh ¡ ul)2
#
¡ kAu°¡1h = 0;
@¦l
@ul
=
Sp2
4¹µ(uh ¡ ul)2 ¡ kBu
°¡1
l = 0
Let ¹ = uh=ul. Then, if we divide marginal revenues by marginal costs
we obtain:
2
Ã
2¡ 2
¹
+
1
¹2
!
=
kA
kB
¹°¡1
which leads to the following implicit expression for ¹:
kA
kB
¹°+1 ¡ 4¹2 + 4¹¡ 2 = 0
Let f(¹) = kA
kB
¹°+1 ¡ 4¹2 + 4¹¡ 2
Lemma 3 The equation f(¹) = 0 can have only one solution for ¹ ¸ 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The lemma shows that there can only be one equilibrium with the brand-
name producer as the higher-priced variety.
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The equilibrium values of the high and low quality, expressed as a function
of ¹ are obtained from the …rst order conditions:
u¤h =
"
Sp2(2¹2 ¡ 2¹+ 1)
kA¹µi2(¹¡ 1)2
# 1
°+1
; u¤l =
"
Sp2
kB4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
# 1
°+1
:
As before, we can establish numerically that there are no pro…table devi-
ations such that A produces the low quality and B the high quality.
We can at this point check the second order conditions for the problem.
@2¦h
@u2h
=
Sp2(2uh ¡ ul)(¡2u2l )
¹µ
¡ kA(° ¡ 1)u°¡2h · 0;
@2¦l
@u2l
=
2Sp2
4¹µ(uh ¡ ul)3 ¡ kB(° ¡ 1)u
°¡2
l = 0
But for the values that satisfy the …rst order conditions Sp
2
4¹µ(¹ul¡ul)2 =
kBu
°¡1
l so that
@2¦l
@u2
l
=
2kBu
°¡1
l
(uh¡ul) ¡kB(°¡1)u
°¡2
l : So the second order conditions
will be satis…ed provided that ¹ ¸ 1 + 2
°¡1
5:
From the characterization of equilibrium we can already establish one of
the main results of this paper:
Proposition 4 The relative market share of the high quality good is a de-
creasing function of the maximum price p, that is, the lower the maximum
price, the higher the relative market share of the high quality product.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This result depends on the fact that, in this model, individuals consume
only one unit of the good6. So relative market shares depend only on the
“position” of the individual who is indi¤erent between the two varieties of
5For ° = 2; this is satis…ed as long as ¹ ¸ 3 which is true if kAkB · 2627 : For ° = 3; this
is satis…ed as long as ¹ ¸ 2 which is true if kAkB · 108 : For ° = 4; this is satis…ed as long as
¹ ¸ 53 which is true if kAkB · 114125 : This values are reasonable cost advantages, but the cost
advantage necessary become higher when the value of ° is very large, to the point that for
° !1, the limiting value of the cost advantage is 2e2 ' 0:26:
6This is actually a good assumption in a market where the amount of consumption is
mostly controlled by the physician.
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the good. This, in turn, depends on the ratio of the price ceiling to the qual-
ity (either one, as the proportion between them is independent of the price
ceiling). But the quality responds to the price ceiling less than proportion-
ally, due to the convexity of the cost of quality. Since price is, then, reduced
proportionally more than quality when the price ceiling is reduced, the indif-
ferent individual is closer to the producer of the low-priced variety. The e¤ect
is actually stronger, the harder it is to modify quality perceptions (the more
convex the cost of quality function). It is critical, then, for this result, that
companies devote a large proportion of their e¤orts to product marketing.
Indeed, pharmaceutical companies advertising budgets are typically at least
as large as those dedicated to R&D.
4 Welfare analysis and public policy
We will discuss the issue of social welfare under two alternative assumptions
about what the policy maker takes into account when taking decisions about
public policy. One possibility is that the policy maker disregards the quality
evaluation of the di¤erent consumers, as the branded product and the generic
one have to be therapeutically equivalent under most legislations.
In this case, the authority would take into account as the “consumer
surplus” a certain constant, K; per consumer that efectively consumes, minus
the price paid. So consumer surplus would be: dCS = (K¡p)Dh+ (K¡pl)Dl
and social welfare: dSW = dCS +¦h +¦l: This expression is equivalent to:
dSWA = KDh +KDl ¡ kAu°h
°
¡ kB u
°
l
°
= SK
"
1¡ p
2µuh
#
¡ kAu
°
h
°
¡ kB u
°
l
°
From this expression we can easily get:
Proposition 5 The social welfare function dSWA is maximized by making
the minimum possible price consistent with …rms’ participation.
Proof. Both uh and ul are increasing in p: Similarly, p=ul is also increasing
in p. Thus, dSWA is decreasing in p:
Although this would appear to be a sensible policy, taking into account
the “objective” properties of these drugs, we do not observe regulators typ-
ically using price caps in such a strong way that it drives pharmaceutical
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companies to their reservation utilities. So,even if this form of regulation
looks normatively sensible, the regulators’ behavior cannot be well explained
with this type of social welfare function in the context of this model.
There is an alternative form of regulation which can better explain behav-
ior. If regulators care about the “perceived utility” of the consumers, then
the consumers’ surplus would take a di¤erent form. After all, the regulator
is (or is appointed by) an elected politician, and voters probably use their
“perceived utility” when voting, rather than the “objective” therapeutical
value of the drug.
In this case, consumer surplus will be:
CSh + CSl = S
"Z µ
µhl
(µuh ¡ p)1
µ
dµ +
Z µhl
µl0
(µul ¡ pl)1
µ
dµ
#
=
Suh
2µ
[µ
2 ¡ µ2hl]¡ pDh +
Sul
2µ
[µ2hl ¡ µ2l0]¡ plDl
Lemma 6 1. The sum of pro…ts can be expressed as:
¦h +¦l = Sp¡
0@ Sp2k1=°B
4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
1A
°
°+1 "
(¹¡ 1)(4¹¡ 3)
¹
+
kA¹
° + 1
°
#
:
2. Let SW = CSh + CSl +¦h +¦l, we have that:
SW =
S¹µ
2
Ã
Sp2
kB4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
! 1
°+1
¡
0@ Sp2k1=°B
4µ(¹¡ 1)2
1A
°
°+1
"
2¹2 ¡ ¹+ 1
¹
+
kA¹
° + 1
°
#
¡k
2
°+1
B
Ã
Sp2
4µ(¹¡ 1)2
!°¡1
°+1
Proof. See Appendix B.
Let A = S¹µ
2
³
S
kB4¹µ(¹¡1)2
´ 1
°+1 ; B =
µ
Sp2k
1=°
B
4¹µ(¹¡1)2
¶ °
°+1 h2¹2¡¹+1
¹
+ kA¹
°+1
°
i
; C =
k
2
°+1
B
µ
S
4µ(¹¡1)2
¶°¡1
°+1
and D =
µ
Sk
1=°
B
4¹µ(¹¡1)2
¶ °
°+1 h (¹¡1)(4¹¡3)
¹
+ kA¹
°+1
°
i
:
Proposition 7 If 1 < °B
A
µ
S
2°
°+1
D
¶2
+(°¡1)C
A
µ
S
2°
°+1
D
¶ 2(°¡2)
°¡1
; then the optimal
p for SW is smaller than the optimal p for ¦h +¦l:
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Proof. See Appendix B.
This proposition is a bit hard to interpret since it holds under a condition
that depends on the parameters in a complicated way. To understand this
condition it is useful to see that:
°
B
A
=
2°k
2
°+1
B
S¹µ
0@ Sp2k1=°B
4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
1A
°¡1
°+1 "
2¹2 ¡ ¹+ 1
¹
+
kA¹
° + 1
°
#
So that
°
B
A
0@ S
2°
°+1
D
1A2 = 4(¹¡ 1)2(° + 1)2
h
2¹2 ¡ ¹+ 1 + kA¹°+1+¹
°
i
2°
h
(¹¡ 1)(4¹¡ 3) + kA¹°+1+¹
°
i2
And from this we have a couple of corollaries that are easier to interpret.
Corollary 8 There is a value of ° <1; large enough that the optimal p for
SW is smaller than the optimal p for ¦h +¦l:
Proof. See Appendix B.
In words, this says that for high °; companies do not like low price ceilings.
Under these conditions qualities are very expensive to produce, so they will
be close to each other. Thus competition in prices will be quite strong, even
without government intervention. Introducing binding price ceilings in this
context may be very detrimental to …rms.
Corollary 9 If 2¹3 + 7¹2 ¡ 58¹ + 12 > 0; and ° ¸ 2; there is a value of
kA > 0; small enough that the optimal p for SW is smaller than the optimal
p for ¦h +¦l
Proof. See Appendix B.
Here the branded producer has noticeably lower costs of quality than
the generic producer. For this reason di¤erentiation is cheap and pro…table,
so …rms can locate in comfortable market niches with substantial monopoly
power. The introduction of price ceilings can disrupt this arrangement.
There will be other environments where price ceilings are not so bad for
…rms. If they have similar and low costs of producing quality, they may
compete as hard in that dimension as they would in the price dimension,
with bad results for the competitors. So they would favor some external
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force constraining them, whereas the consumers would be happier just letting
them compete strongly.
However, given the evidence that countries with stronger regulations
(even those with similar sizes, and wealth) tend to be the largest net im-
porters of pharmaceutical products, it is reasonable to think that one of the
corollaries hold. Given the early mover advantage that the branded producer
enjoys, it seems most likely that corollary 8 holds. Further empirical work
would be necessary to fully answer the question.
5 Conclusions and further work
This paper has studied price regulations in an oligopolistic market with ver-
tical product di¤erentiation. We feel this is an appropriate model for the
pharmaceutical market when generic products compete with brand name ex-
patent holders. The conclusions from the model can explain the empirical
evidence available from this market. It also provides some implications for
policy work.
We have not studied the connection of o¤-patent markets with the mar-
kets during the time that the patent holds. It would be interesting to inves-
tigate the connection between the two periods. In principle the incentives
to innovation should come from the duration of the patent period and its
breadth, but from the point of view of welfare it could be better to connect
the patent policy with the post-patent regulatory environment.
Another aspect that we do not study is the regulation of pharmacies
and the prescription activity by physicians. A more complete model should
include all those actors, and the incentives provided for their activities.
But we feel that the more rewarding area for future work would be the
empirical investigation of determinants of policies across countries. We have
emphasized that the importance of foreign versus national production of
pharmaceutical products is key in determining the regulatory regime. Al-
though there is some evidence in that direction, a more careful study of that,
and other aspects in‡uencing regulation, would be necessary.
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6 Appendix A
In this appendix we propose a variation of our model which can account for
the fact that the producer of the high-priced variety charges a higher price
under competition than under monopoly. As in the main text we have that
consumers have utility functions: µu ¡ p;if she buys one unit of the good
of quality u at price p; and 0 otherwise. But now the distribution of µ is
not uniform, but rather has a two point support. A proportion p of the
population has a taste parameter and ¹µ and a proportion (1¡ p) has a taste
parameter µ. The total mass of consumers is given by S. The …xed cost of
quality level u is as before, Fi = kAu
°
°
; i 2 fA;Bg.
The game unfolds as follows. The …rms decide on the (unique) quality
level, u, with which they will endow their products7. Then the …rms compete
in prices.
First, we analyze the game under monopoly. We will later turn to the
duopoly case.
Suppose …rst that the …rm decides to serve both consumer types. We
will check later under which conditions this is optimal. If both types of
consumer are served, then the price will be pm = µum so that pro…ts are
¦m = Sµum ¡ kAu
°
m
°
. Then @¦m
@um
= Sµ ¡ kAu°¡1m , which implies that um =³
Sµ
kA
´ 1
°¡1 , pm = µ
³
Sµ
kA
´ 1
°¡1 and ¦m =
³
Sµ
kA
´ °
°¡1
³
°¡1
°
´
:
Suppose now that only the high type of consumer is served., then the
price will be pm = ¹µum so that pro…ts are ¦m = S¹µpum¡kAu
°
m
°
. Then @¦m
@um
=
S¹µp¡ kAu°¡1m , which implies that um =
³
S¹µp
kA
´ 1
°¡1 and ¦m =
³
S¹µp
kA
´ °
°¡1
³
°¡1
°
´
:
The condition for the market to be served entirely is then ¹µp · µ or ¹µp
µ
· 1:
Let us analyze now the duopoly case. In the price game the low price
…rm will charge pl = µul: The high price ph has to be set so that the low
quality …rm does not want to attract the consumers with higher preference
for quality. To do that, the low quality …rm would have to set p¤ such that
¹µul¡p¤ = ¹µuh¡ph so that p¤ = ph¡¹µ(uh¡ul): Notice that this implies that
p¤ < ph¡ µ(uh¡ul) which implies that µul¡ p¤ ¸ µuh¡ ph and low types do
not want to go the high quality …rm if p¤ is o¤ered. If the low quality …rm
7This assumes that monopolies cannot price discriminate by creating two varieties with
di¤erent quality levels and prices. This could be because the …xed cost of brand creation
is too large to be justi…ed by the price discrimination bene…t. In fact we do not typically
observe more than one product variety o¤ered under monopoly.
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sets p¤ its pro…ts in the price subgame (remember that the quality costs are
sunk at this stage) are Sp¤: So to avoid this deviation ph has to be at most
such that Sp¤ = S(1¡ p)µul, which implies that ph = ¹µ(uh¡ul)+ (1¡ p)µul:
Now we can solve the quality subgame. ¦l = S(1¡ p)µul ¡ kB u
°
l
°
. Then
@¦l
@ul
= S(1 ¡ p)µ ¡ kBu°¡1l , which implies that ul =
³
S(1¡p)µ
kB
´ 1
°¡1
: ¦h =
Sp
³
¹µ(uh ¡ ul) + (1¡ p)µul
´
¡kAu
°
l
°
: Then @¦h
@uh
= Sp¹µ¡kAu°¡1h , which implies
that uh =
³
Sp¹µ
kA
´ 1
°¡1
: Thus we have that:
ph = ¹µ
0@ÃSp¹µ
kA
! 1
°¡1
¡
Ã
S(1¡ p)µ
kB
! 1
°¡1
1A+ (1¡ p)µÃS(1¡ p)µ
kB
! 1
°¡1
The previous discusion can be summarized in the following
Proposition 10 The price of the high quality variety under duopoly is higher
than the price under monopoly (that is, ph ¸ pm) if:
¹µ
0@ÃSp¹µ
kA
! 1
°¡1
¡
Ã
S(1¡ p)µ
kB
! 1
°¡1
1A+(1¡p)µÃS(1¡ p)µ
kB
! 1
°¡1
¸ µ
Ã
Sµ
kA
! 1
°¡1
Let ¸ = ¹µ
µ
and remember that to have the monopolist catering to the
whole population we need ¸p · 1:
Corollary 11 If ° = 2; then the price of the high quality variety under
duopoly is higher than the price under monopoly (that is, ph ¸ pm) if:
¸p ¸ ¸
kA
kB
+ 1¡ (1¡ p)2 kA
kB
¸+ kA
kB
Proof. From the proposition we have that if ° = 2; ph=pm ¸ 1 when
¸2p¡ ¸(1¡ p)kA
kB
+ (1¡ p)2 kA
kB
¸ 1
A straightforward manipulation of the expression leads to the result.
The condition in the corollary reduces to ¸p ¸ ¸+1¡(1¡p)2
¸+1
= 1 ¡ (1¡p)2
1+¸
when kA
kB
= 1:
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7 Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1
First note that f(¹) < 0 for ¹ · 7
4
; so that any solution has to be larger
than 7
4
: We will now show that to the right of 7
4
; the function f is …rst
decreasing and then increasing. Since f(7
4
) < 0; and the function has to be
eventually positive, the result will follow.
Let ¹¤ be the lowest value of ¹ ¸ 7
4
such that f 0(¹¤) = 0: Since f 0(7
4
) < 0;
this implies that f 0(¹) must be increasing at ¹ = ¹¤: Thus f 00(¹¤) > 0: Also,
notice that f 0 is a convex function to the right of 7
4
: Thus, for ¹ ¸ ¹¤; we have
that f 0(¹) ¸ f 0(¹¤)+f 00(¹¤)(¹¡¹¤) = f 00(¹¤)(¹¡¹¤) ¸ 0; so that f 0(¹) ¸ 0,
for ¹ ¸ ¹¤ Since ¹¤ is the lowest value of ¹ ¸ 7
4
such that f 0(¹¤) = 0; then
f 0(¹) · 0, for 7
4
· ¹ · ¹¤ and f 0(¹) ¸ 0, for ¹ ¸ ¹¤:
Proof of proposition 2
The price under monopoly, is given by pm =
¹µ
2
um; and the optimal quality
um =
³
S¹µ
2
kA4
´ 1
°¡1
: This implies that pm =
³
S¹µ
°+1
kA2°+1
´ 1
°¡1
: Under duopoly ph =
2¹µ(¹¡1)uh
4¹¡1 =
2¹µ(¹¡1)
4¹¡1
µ
4¹µS[4¹3¡3¹2+2)]
kA(4¹¡1)3
¶ 1
°¡1
: This implies that
ph
pm
=
4(¹¡ 1)
4¹¡ 1
Ã
64¹3 ¡ 48¹2 + 32
64¹3 ¡ 48¹2 + 12¹¡ 1
! 1
°¡1
:
Since ¹ ¸ 1, we have that 4(¹¡1)
4¹¡1 < 1: So, if
64¹3¡48¹2+32
64¹3¡48¹2+12¹¡1 · 1; then phpm < 1:
If 64¹
3¡48¹2+32
64¹3¡48¹2+12¹¡1 > 1; then
³
64¹3¡48¹2+32
64¹3¡48¹2+12¹¡1
´ 1
°¡1 · 64¹3¡48¹2+32
64¹3¡48¹2+12¹¡1 ; since
° ¸ 2 so ph
pm
· 4(¹¡1)
4¹¡1
³
64¹3¡48¹2+32
64¹3¡48¹2+12¹¡1
´
: But 4(¹¡1)
4¹¡1
³
64¹3¡48¹2+32
64¹3¡48¹2+12¹¡1
´
< 1 if
and only if ¡192¹3 + 96¹2 + 112¹ ¡ 129 < 0: This is true since this is a
decreasing function (¡576¹2 + 192¹2 + 112 < 0) when ¹ ¸ 1 and ¡192 +
96 + 112¡ 129 < 0:
Proof of lemma 3
We will now show that to the right of 1; the function f is either always
increasing, or …rst decreasing and then increasing. Since f(1) < 0; and the
function has to be eventually positive, the result will follow.
Suppose …rst that f 0(1) = kA
kB
(° + 1)¡ 4 ¸ 0: Then, since ° ¸ 2; we have
that 1
2
f 00(1) = kA
kB
(°+1)°
2
¡4 ¸ 0: Since f 0 is a convex function to the right of
1; it must be true for ¹ ¸ 1 that f 0(¹) ¸ f 0(1)+f 00(1)(¹¡1) ¸ 0:Now, assume
that f 0(1) < 0: Let ¹¤ be the lowest value of ¹ ¸ 1 such that f 0(¹¤) = 0:
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Since f 0(1) < 0; this implies that f 0(¹) must be increasing at ¹ = ¹¤: Thus
f 00(¹¤) ¸ 0: Since f 0 is a convex function to the right of 1: Thus, for ¹ ¸ ¹¤;
we have that f 0(¹) ¸ f 0(¹¤) + f 00(¹¤)(¹ ¡ ¹¤) = f 00(¹¤)(¹ ¡ ¹¤) ¸ 0; and
f 0(¹) ¸ 0, for ¹ ¸ ¹¤: Since ¹¤ is the lowest value of ¹ ¸ 1 such that
f 0(¹¤) = 0; then f 0(¹) · 0, for 7
4
· ¹ · ¹¤:
Proof of Proposition 4
We have that p¡pl = p¡p=2¹; and uh¡ul = (¹¡1)ul: This means that
Dh
Dl
=
S
µ
µ
µ ¡ p(
2¹¡1
2¹ )
(¹¡1)ul
¶
S
µ
µ
p( 2¹¡12¹ )
(¹¡1)ul ¡
p
2¹
ul
¶ = 2µ(¹¡ 1)ul
p
¡ 2¹¡ 1
2¹
:
If we substitute into this expression the value for ul we have:
Dh
Dl
= 2µ(¹¡ 1)p¡°¡1°+1
"
S
kB4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
# 1
°+1
¡ 2¹¡ 1
2¹
:
Since ¹ does not depend on p; and ° > 1, this function is clearly decreasing
in p:
Proof of Lemma 6.
CSh =
Suh
2µ
[µ
2 ¡ µ2hl]¡ Sp
Ã
1¡ µhl
µ
!
=
S¹ul
2µ
24µ2 ¡ Ã p (2¹¡ 1)
2¹(¹¡ 1)ul
!235¡ Sp "1¡ p (2¹¡ 1)
µ2¹(¹¡ 1)ul
#
=
S¹ul
2
µ ¡ S
2µ
"
p2 (2¹¡ 1)2
4¹(¹¡ 1)2ul
#
¡ Sp
"
1¡ p (2¹¡ 1)
µ2¹(¹¡ 1)ul
#
=
S¹ul
2
µ ¡ S (2¹¡ 1) p
2
2µ¹(¹¡ 1)ul
"
3¡ 2¹
4(¹¡ 1)
#
¡ Sp
=
S¹ul
2
µ ¡
0@ Sp2k1=°B
4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
1A
°
°+1 "
(3¡ 2¹)(2¹¡ 1)
2¹
#
¡ Sp
CSl =
Sul
2µ
[µ2hl ¡ µ2l0]¡ plDl
20
=
Sul
2µ
264
0@ p
³
2¹¡1
2¹
´
(¹¡ 1)ul
1A2 ¡ Ã p
2¹ul
!2375¡ Sp2
4µ(¹¡ 1)2u2l
=
0@ Sp2k1=°B
4µ(¹¡ 1)2
1A
°
°+1 "
(3¹¡ 2)
2¹
#
¡ k
2
°+1
B
Ã
Sp2
4µ(¹¡ 1)2
!°¡1
°+1
:
So
CSh + CSl =
S¹µ
2
Ã
Sp2
kB4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
! 1
°+1
+
0@ Sp2k1=°B
4µ(¹¡ 1)2
1A
°
°+1 "
4¹2 ¡ 5¹+ 1
2¹
#
¡k
2
°+1
B
Ã
Sp2
4µ(¹¡ 1)2
!°¡1
°+1
¡ Sp
¦h =
Sp
¹µ
"
¹µ ¡ p(2¹¡ 1)
2¹(¹¡ 1)ul
#
¡ kA¹
°u°l
°
= Sp¡
0@ Sp2k1=°B
4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
1A
°
°+1
"
2(¹¡ 1)(2¹¡ 1)
¹
+
kA¹
°
°
#
:
¦l =
Sp2
4¹µ¹(¹¡ 1)ul ¡
kB
°
u°l
=
0@ Sp2k1=°B
4¹µ(¹¡ 1)2
1A
°
°+1 "
¹¡ 1
¹
¡ 1
°
#
Proof of Proposition 7
Both SW and ¦h + ¦l are concave functions. The function ¦ = Sp ¡
Dp
2°
°+1 ; so that its argmax (as a function of p) occurs for bp = µ S2°
°+1
D
¶ °+1
°¡1
:
Also, the function SW = Ap
2
°+1 ¡Bp 2°°+1 ¡Cp 2(°¡1)°+1 : Its maximum occurs
when 2
°+1
Ap
1¡°
°+1 ¡ 2°
°+1
Bp
°¡1
°+1 ¡ 2(°¡1)
°+1
Cp
°¡3
°+1 = 0; or, equivalently, when A ¡
°Bp
2(°¡1)
°+1 ¡ (° ¡ 1)Cp 2(°¡2)°+1 = 0: Denote this maximum value by bbp: Denote
by F (x) the following function: F (x) = A¡ °Bx 2(°¡1)°+1 ¡ (°¡ 1)Cx 2(°¡2)°+1 : bbp is
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de…ned by F ( bbp) = 0: Since F (:) is a decreasing function, if F ( bp) < 0, thenbbp < bp.
But F ( bp) = A ¡ °B µ S2°
°+1
D
¶2
¡ (° ¡ 1)C
µ
S
2°
°+1
D
¶ 2(°¡2)
°¡1
; which implies
that F ( bp) < 0; if and only if A < °B µ S2°
°+1
D
¶2
+ (° ¡ 1)C
µ
S
2°
°+1
D
¶ 2(°¡2)
°¡1
and
the results follows.
Proof of Corollary 8
If ° ! 1, then ¹ ! 1. Also, from the equation that implicitly de…nes
¹ one can see that ¹ <
³
4kB
kA
´ 1
°¡1 . This means that kA¹
°+1+¹
°
! 0: Which
implies that
4(¹¡ 1)2(° + 1)
h
2¹2 ¡ ¹+ 1 + kA¹°+1+¹
°
i
2°
h
(¹¡ 1)(4¹¡ 3) + kA¹°+1+¹
°
i2 !1
Proof of Corollary 9
If kA = 0; we have that °BA
µ
S
2°
°+1
D
¶2
=
4(¹¡1)2(°+1)2[2¹2¡¹+1+¹° ]
2°[(¹¡1)(4¹¡3)+¹° ]
2 . Since
° ¸ 2; we have that
4(¹¡ 1)2(° + 1)2
h
2¹2 ¡ ¹+ 1 + ¹
°
i
2°
h
(¹¡ 1)(4¹¡ 3) + ¹
°
i2 > 9(¹¡ 1)2 [2¹2 ¡ ¹+ 1]h
(¹¡ 1)(4¹¡ 3) + ¹
2
i2
=
18¹4 ¡ 45¹3 + 9¹2 ¡ 27¹+ 9
16¹4 ¡ 52¹3 + 265
4
¹2 ¡ 39¹+ 9
But if 2¹3+7¹2¡58¹+12 > 0; then 18¹4¡45¹3+9¹2¡27¹+9
16¹4¡52¹3+ 265
4
¹2¡39¹+9 > 1 and the result
follows.
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